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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 




JAMES & JACKSON LLC, individually and 
derivatively on behalf of MBC, GOSPEL 
NETWORK, LLC., 
~ DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR eOURI 
) FULTON COUNTY, GA 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EVANDER HOLYFIELD, JR., WILLIE E. 
GARY, CECIL FIELDER, LORENZO 
WILLIAMS, THOMAS WEIKSNAR, CHAN 
ABNEY, LORI METOYER-BROWN, and 
RICK NEWBERGER, 
Defendants. 







ORDER ON PROGRAMMING ACQUISITIONS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
The parties appeared telephonically before the Court on May 22, 2008, to present oral 
argument on the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Programming Acquisitions, LLC 
("Programming"). After reviewing the record of the case, the arguments of counsel, and the 
briefs submitted on the motion, the Court finds as follows: 
FACTS: 
This case involves a dispute arising from an April 2006, cash-out merger of MBC 
Gospel Network, LLC ("MBC"), a Delaware limited liability company, into Programming, also 
a Delaware limited liability company. 
Plaintiff James and Jackson LLC ("J&J") was a founding member and twenty percent 
(20%) member of MBC. Willie Gary, LLC ("WGLLC") was the controlling, and only other 
member of MBC, with eighty percent (80%). 
In 2005, WGLLC filed suit in Delaware Chancery Court to compel J&J's consent to the 
addition of a third member, or, in the alternative, to dissolve MBC. Chancellor Strine found 
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that the MBC Operating Agreement did not condition the withholding of consent on 
reasonableness, and thus, the Delaware Court could not compel J&J's consent. Thereafter, 
the parties discussed dissolution of MBC. WGLLC, however, withdrew the petition prior to a 
final order or other action in the case. 
Around this time period, WGLLC and several individuals, including the individually-
named Defendants, formed Programming, the entity into which MBC would soon merge. 
WGLLC has twenty-three members including Defendants Evander Holyfield, Jr., Willie E. 
Gary, Cecil Fielder, Lorenzo Williams, Chan Abney, and Lori Metoyer-Brown, all of whom 
were on the management board of MBC and all of whom are owners in Programming. In 
addition, Defendant Rick Newberger was the CEO of MBC and is an owner of Programming; 
and Defendant Thomas Weiksnar was on the management board of MBC and is also an 
owner in Programming. On April 26, 2006, Programming and MBC finalized a $1 cash-out 
merger. 
Plaintiff complains that the merger was a self-interested transaction and raises 
several direct and derivative claims of breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, and 
conspiracy of breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Court ruled on similar issues in its October 10, 2007 Order on Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss (the "MTD Order"), which was decided before Programming was added as a party. 
Thus, the Court shall revisit these difficult issues. 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION: 
The first issue before this Court is whether Programming has sufficient contacts with 
Georgia in order to justify this Court's exercise of jurisdiction over it. 
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A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if there is 
sufficient basis under the forum's long arm jurisdiction statute and the nonresident 
defendant's actions demonstrate minimum contacts sufficient to meet the due process 
considerations found in the U.S. Constitution. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985). Georgia's long arm jurisdiction statute establishes personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident who commits a tortious act or omission, causes an injury, or "transacts any 
business" in this state. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91.1 
The scope of Georgia's long arm statute with respect to the "transacts any business" 
prong is coterminous with the limits of due process. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Serv., 
LLC, v. First Nat'l Bank of Ames, Iowa, 279 Ga. 672 (2005) remanded to 280 Ga. App. 337 
(2006). "The constitutional touchstone is whether the defendant purposefully established 
minimum contacts in the forum State, that is, whether the defendant's conduct and 
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court there." Home Depot Supply, Inc., v. Hunter Management. LLC., 289 Ga. App. 286, 
289 (2008). 
1 O.C.GA § 9-10-91 
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his executor or 
administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or 
possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he were a resident of the state, if in 
person or through an agent, he: 
(1) Transacts any business within this state; 
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of 
character arising from the act; 
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor 
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives 
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; 
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state; or 
(5) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an 
action for divorce or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a 
matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant 
resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. 
This paragraph shall not change the residency requirement for filing an action for divorce. 
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In evaluating the Constitutional considerations of personal jurisdiction based upon 
"transacts any business," the Court applies a three-part test: (1) whether or not the 
defendant purposefully consummated a transaction or did an act within this state; (2) whether 
the cause of action arises from such act or transactions; and (3) whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Aero Toy 
Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 517 (2006). The first two prongs of the Aero Toy 
test establish "minimum contacts" and the third factor evaluates the reasonableness of 
asserting jurisdiction. Id. Such reasonableness factors include "the burden on defendant, the 
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution to controversies, and the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive 
social policies." Id. at 518. 
A defendant who moves a court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction bears the 
burden of proving the court's lack of jurisdiction. Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 420 
(1990). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a trial court construes the uncontroverted 
complaint allegations as true; where evidence is offered, it is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Delong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845 
(11th Cir.1988). 
Programming, a Delaware limited liability company, filed a certificate of authority to do 
business in Georgia days after the MBC merger closed. In addition, Programming assumed 
and operated out of MBC's headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia. Defendants pOint out 
that these "contacts" took place after the merger closed and thus have no connection with nor 
did they give rise to Plaintiff's cause of action. That argument, however, overlooks that 
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Programming was engaged in merger negotiations with MBC prior to the close of the deal. 
While the merger may be have been negotiated and closed in Delaware, as Defendants 
claim, the negotiations concerned property and other tangible and intangible assets located in 
Georgia. Surely this state has an interest in and authority over a suit against a non-resident 
who contracts to buy assets in Georgia, buys those assets, and ultimately operates those 
assets in the State, especially where the plaintiff's complaint challenges the underlying 
transaction conveying those assets. Additionally, the Court finds no grave inconvenience to 
Programming, who has several members living in or near this jurisdiction, to defend this suit 
in Georgia. 
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Programming has 
sufficient contacts with Georgia in order for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it; 
therefore, Programming's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED on this issue. 
VENUE: 
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93, venue is proper in the county "wherein a substantial 
part of the business was transacted." In addition, "[w]here an action is brought against a 
resident of this state, any nonresident of this state who is involved in the same transaction or 
occurrence ... may be joined as a defendant in the county where a resident defendant is 
suable." Id. 
Here, Programming assumed and operated out of MBC's former headquarters in 
Fulton County. Additionally, Ms. Metoyer-Brown is a resident of Fulton County. Thus, venue 
in Fulton County is proper and Programming's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED on this 
issue. 
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FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM: 
A party seeking a motion to dismiss brought under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted must demonstrate that plaintiff's allegations in 
the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of provable facts asserted in support thereof. Common Cause/Georgia v. City of 
Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 481 (2005). The internal affairs of a corporation, such as actions 
involving officers and directions, shall be regulated by the law of the state of incorporation. 
Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc .. Architects & Planners. Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (1985). 
A. Direct Claims 
Defendants argue that J&J suffered no direct harm as a result of the merger and has 
no standing to bring direct claims. WGLLC was the controlling member of MBC. See In re 
PNB Holding Co. Shareholders Litigation, 2006 WL 2403999, at *9 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2006) (citing 
the "well established test for a controlling shareholder under Delaware law ... (1) owns more 
than 50% of the voting power of a corporation; or (2) exercised control over the business and 
affairs of the corporation."). In cases with a controlling shareholder, the Delaware Courts 
have allowed direct actions to proceed where the minority shareholder has been 
disproportionately injured. See, Rhodes v. Silkroad Equity LLC, 2007 WL 2058736 (Del. Ch., 
July 11, 2007) (recognizing the ability of certain claims to be both derivative and direct where 
the injury falls disproportionately upon the minority shareholder); Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A. 
2d 91 (Del. 2006) (allowing direct claims where the majority shareholder transferred 
economic and voting power away from the minority shareholder); Feldman v. Cutaia, 2007 
WL 2215956 (Del. Ch. 2007) (allowing direct claims to proceed against a majority 
shareholder who exercised control over the corporation and who diluted the minority 
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shareholder's interest in the corporation). In the instant case, the controlling member 
(WGLLC) of MBC entered into a transaction with another company (Programming) that it 
owned and negotiated a cash-out merger (of MBC into Programming). The merger resulted 
in an exchange of stock in the new company and the extinguishment of MBC debt, which was 
held by WGLLC,2 in exchange for $1 for MBC. Like the plaintiffs in Rhodes, Gentile and 
Feldmen, J&J claims that the merger improperly deprived them of their interest in MBC. 
In accordance with the above-stated reasoning and the reasoning stated in the 
previous MTD Order, the Court hereby finds that J&J has standing to bring direct claims 
against Programming and DENIES Programming's Motion to Dismiss on this issue. 
B. Appraisal vs. Equitable Remedies 
Second, Programming argues that J&J's sole remedy post-merger is for an appraisal 
of the fair market value of the shares (Le., a review of whether or not $1 was a fair price). 
In Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43 (2000), the former minority shareholder in a merged 
corporation brought suit against the controlling shareholders and the surviving corporation. In 
Nggy, defendants Bistricer and Stein were the controlling shareholders of the merged 
company and the surviving company. They negotiated and signed the merger agreement 
which extinguished Nagy's interest. Nagy sought an appraisal action, in addition to claiming 
breached of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting such breaches. Id. at 48-49. The 
Delaware Chancery Court was faced with the question of whether Nagy could bring both 
equitable (breach of fiduciary duty) and appraisal claims. Vice Chancellor Strine reasoned 
that fiduciary duty claims raised issues "unrelated to valuation" where the merger was an 
2 J&J alleges that WGLLC was obligated to satisfy all future capital calls to MBC under the terms of the 
Operating Agreement, but that WGLLC improperly characterized these contributions as "loans". Thus, WGLLC 
was able to recoup some of its investment in MBC as an unsecured creditor and receive a stake in the surviving 
company, whereas J&J received its 20% share of $1.00. 
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allegedly self-dealing transaction that benefited the controlling shareholders at the expense of 
the minority. Id. at 51. Additionally Vice Chancellor Strine contrasted the narrow statutory 
appraisal remedy with the broad remedy available in a "fraud action asserting fair dealing and 
fair price claims," which include "in its relief any damages sustained by the shareholders." Id. 
at 52. Where plaintiffs "have alleged that individual defendants stood on both sides of the 
cash out merger. .. and failed to provide any method for determining whether the merger was 
entirely fair to the shareholders independent of the defendants themselves ... [and] claim that 
the resulting price was unfair .... [the complaint] states a claim sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss .... " Id. at 53, citing Wood v. Franke E. Best. Inc., Del. Ch., memo op., 1999 WL 
504779. 
The ~ case is analogous this case. This Court finds, consistent with Delaware 
Law, that where the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a breach of fiduciary duty, such as with 
an interested-director transaction, the plaintiff may pursue equitable remedies available for 
fraud. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Programming's Motion to 
Dismiss on this issue. 
C. Derivative Claims 
Finally, Programming urges this Court to find that Plaintiff has no standing to bring a 
derivative suit. The effect of a merger is typically to deprive the shareholder of the merged 
company standing to bring derivative suits. Lewis V. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 899 (Del. 2004); 
see also, Lewis V. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984). There are narrow exceptions to this 
rule as discussed in the previous MTD Order, where fraud is alleged or where the merger is 
merely a reorganization. See Lewis V. Ward, 852 A.2d 896 (Del. 2004); Kramer V. Western 
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Pacific Industries, Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 354 (Del. 1988); Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 
(De. 1984). 
Under a broad reading of "fraud" to mean a self-dealing transaction or a strategic 
maneuver to abrogate a judicial process, this Court found in its previous MTD Order that 
Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to survive the earlier motion to dismiss and bring derivative 
claims. See,~, Feldman v. Cutaia, 2007 WL 2215956, at *11 (Del. Ch. 2007) (reasoning 
that the fraud exception extended to transactions motivated by the "pendency" of a case or 
allegations of a "fraudulent" merger). Thus, the merger has not extinguished Plaintiff's 
general right to bring derivative claims in this case. 
However, Programming, as the surviving company, owns whatever derivative claims 
Plaintiff may raise on MSC's behalf. This anomalous situation of a "corporation suing itself 
for its own benefit" is one that Delaware courts have rendered moot. Sokat v. Getty Oil 
Company, 262 A.2d 246, 249 (1970) ("The action against Getty Oil has therefore been made 
moot by the merger, for if this were not so, the anomalous situation of a corporation suing 
itself for its own benefit would be presented."). Thus, Plaintiff's derivative claims may riot 
proceed against Programming, although Plaintiffs' claims against the individual directors may. 
Id. ("This conclusion, however, does not mean that the [derivative] claims asserted against 
the individual defendants ... have likewise been made moot."). Accordingly, Programming's 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' derivative claims is hereby GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this ~ f( day of June, 2008. 
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